In discussions of the conservation of culturally significant architecture, awareness about issues of temporality and its theoretical import has been approached from varied, partial, perspectives. These perspectives have usually focused on accounts of temporality that focus on the past and the present -and more rarely the future -without considering either the complete spectrum of human temporality or its ontological bases. This article addresses this shortcoming with a phenomenology of conservation grounded on the fundamental attitudes of cultivation and care. After a phenomenological and existentialist analysis of Cesare Brandi's thought -focusing on his paradigmatic Theory of Restoration -his attitude comes forth as a limited instance of the modern conservation attitude that is concerned exclusively with architecture as art. This attitude results in a limited temporal intentionality. Following Ingarden and Ricoeur, the existential approach is here applied to the deduced dimensions of the space and time of Dasein -in Heidegger's terms -outlining the grounding of conservation on an existential interpretation of the more fundamental notions of cultivation and care. This interpretation suggests a solution for the modern impasse with an existential account of both the artistic grounding of architecture and its characterisation as the place that temporally accompanies Dasein. Architecture thus emerges as a manifold being, constituting existentially the space for the authentic human being, whose temporal consciousness compels it to cultivate and care about that space, thus enriching the possible approaches to conservation as a collective endeavour.
INTRODUCTION
The distinction between consciousness and object allowed Husserl to suggest a setting for human beings within which they can be conscious of their constant becoming in time. In Husserl's suggested temporality, humans exist by having a past, present, and future. 1 For conservators of architecture, however, the centre of gravity of temporality has often, and preferentially, been situated in the past, sometimes in the present, but only rarely in the future. Following Husserl, Heidegger, more than any other philosopher, started to question not so much the relation between a human being's consciousness and time, but also the existence of human being as temporality and thus, in a broader sense, Being as temporality. We will follow Heidegger in focusing on the concept of Dasein as the place of disclosure of Being. For Heidegger,
Dasein, as a being-in-the-world, overcomes the subject-object paradigm, thus emphasising humanity's embeddedness in the environment. Part of the appeal of these frameworks is that Cesare Brandi, with whose work we will engage, primarily positioned his later aesthetic theories -in particular his Teoria Generale della Critica -in these philosophical terms. 2 Accordingly we will attempt to illuminate the relation between Dasein's temporality and architecture by interpreting this relation in the context of a critical dialogue between Heidegger's existential philosophy and Brandi's theoretical framework in his Theory of Restoration, taken as an example of the modern approach to conservation. 3 Our aim is to articulate a more holistic attitude to architectural conservation, thus achieving a consideration of human inhabitation within an architectural heritage while placing dwellers as the focus of the restoration.
We will challenge modern conservation attitudes which privilege a fetishisation of the past manifested in architectural objects.
The place where humanity dwells is formed by nature and architecture. This all-embracing environment constitutes the only possible dwelling place and thus the only possible horizon for human perception and experience. Gadamer writing metaphorically, says, "[...] a hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us. They constitute, then, the horizon of a particular present, for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see." 4 Taken to apply to our physical environment, Gadamer's view means that by the time we reflect in the present about our all-embracing environment, we already have preconceived perceptions and intuitions about it that cannot but determine our understanding of it.
The built environment can be read, but how? As a sort of trace or inscription, as
Ricoeur has described the city, the architectural place discloses readable structures as part of these unavoidable predispositions. 5 These structures, however, are neither static nor fixed. They evolve along with the historicity of Dasein, but so too does the built environment. The environment reacts to each step we take or action we perform.
The city is the paradigmatic place where this happens. Processes of memory and assimilation incessantly take place there and with them humans evolve in time,
constantly unveiling and concealing their existential condition. Heidegger's concept of disclosedness involves then an uninterrupted decoding of Dasein's place in the world, an understanding that is always merged with that of Dasein's constant temporalizing. 6 Heidegger had first suggested in Being and Time that temporality is ontologically primary; however, in his later writings he was more concerned about the issue of dwelling, as the fundamental way of Dasein's being-in-the-world. Because of this shift in favour of place instead of time, scholars have suggested the primacy of place for Heidegger's concept of Dasein, considering the German origin of the word that is already stating a there (Da) before a when. 7 As we approach an interpretation of the conservation endeavour's intentionality, this philosophical background allows us to begin addressing the architectural place in existential terms. This interpretation of existence rests on some of Ingarden's modes of being as well as on some phenomenological, temporal standpoints concerning the architectural place, understood now as Dasein's sheltering environment. A hermeneutical journey through the architectural place and a phenomenological approach to the assimilation of its transformation are taken as indications of an existential and more fundamental condition for conservation than mere fetishisation of architecture. We will take Brandi's Theory of Restoration, which focused on the conservation of the work of art, architecture included, only as a work of art, as typical of the modern approach to conservation that is here to be criticized.
We turn now to an engagement with the significant issue of architecture as inhabited art and Brandi's concept of astanza (pure presence).
FROM PERCEPTION TO TEMPORAL EPISTEMOLOGY
In ancient times, or in some primitive cultures, understanding about and orientation to the world was considered an inherent human ability. Advances in technology brought precision, but at the cost of an abandonment of this intimate awareness of being-in-the-world. Absent scientific weather forecasting, farmers knew about changes in the weather by observing environmental evidence; without GPS technology to guide them, sailors used to observe the sun and other stars to orient themselves. Our world has become mediated --represented --and our direct experience of it has been weakened. Something about our awareness or our relation with our environment was lost with the advent of modernity.
Conservation, as conceived in Brandi's Theory of Restoration, is consistent with this modern shift, considering the architectural place where mankind dwells, not as somewhere in which humanity is embedded, but as a separated something. Modern conservation, within the modern paradigm that separates subject and object, is but a way of humanity approaching the world while concealing its existential role there, thus hindering the revelation of the world as the place where human being is. Current controversies about conservation, development and regeneration projects evidence attitudes where objectification of buildings and disdain towards local dwellers hinder the achievement of agreeable solutions for the main stakeholders. 8 In many of these controversies, the body-space relationship in the constitution of architecture is both merged with and overwhelmed by collective memory. Nevertheless, for the modern attitude in conservation, architecture emerges mainly as a static condition: a condition that seems limited to convey mainly the sensual parts of the architectural manifold. In
Ingarden's ontology, objects can be either temporal or extra-temporal objects. He proposes three kinds of temporal beings that we may consider as candidates for how we perceive architecture according to the determination of time: architecture as event,
architecture as process and architecture as an object enduring in time. 9 Modern conservation perceptions constitutes architecture as an event in time, thus downplaying, or even ignoring, the other two.
Individual Sensual Experiences
Setting a matrix of the elements constituting the existential determination of Architecture perceived as event can also be correlated with Dasein's ordinary life because it works as the background for that life. 6 -to use Heidegger's term -would not be able to discern the hidden architectural truth via the apprehension of our being merged with the place, which remains concealed.
This relation is latent only at a sensual level due to the dominance of the visual.
Awareness about the architectural place begins in childhood and develops from the body. The seminal assimilation of the architectural place through the senses originates its image in consciousness in the form of memories and recollections. Thus, when the moment of objectivising architecture comes, its image as event in time appears as one of the essential ways to concretize it.
Pervasiveness of the Image
This prevalence of the visual is evidenced in the pervasiveness of the image in
Western culture and conservation is no exception to this. For Brandi's aesthetics, as well as his theory of restoration, the image is privileged as the locus of the manifestation of pure presence that he names astanza. Arguably, the image that conservation privileges is not always artistic. Despite the privileged character of the visual image, other bodily perceptions can be, phenomenologically, the first possible experiences of human spatiality. For human beings the earliest perceived space is the womb: one's own body, the space that one occupies and the fluid that surrounds one, although without differentiation into self and environment. At this primordial level, we are as one with the environment. Later, after birth, the air that we breathe is part of us while inside us, detaching from us when exhaled; for this, and similar reasons, the limit of our body is not sharply perceived. Awareness of the body being embedded in the medium is concealed from the modern gaze and consequently the architectural 
Temporal Processes of Meaning Production
The notion of historical temporality, embraced by conservation in its modern from an epistemological interpretation of memory and history towards a path of critical and hermeneutical ontology. 12 For us, this suggested move requires an excursus to face the problem that was the main concern for Brandi, namely the one of the nature of art in architecture, and our criticism of his forgetting of being.
THE UNCONCEALED OBJECT OF ESTRANGED CONSERVATION
A work of art in general seems to have an ontological origin in its materials and in a certain attunement in consciousness. Thus, in Heidegger's terms, art appeals to Dasein's being through art's being. Art's being is found, however, not in matter, but in consciousness. As Ingarden suggests, art is supported on the matter of the workthrough which it is revealed -but the artistic quality is immaterial; it is pure presence, what Brandi calls astanza. 13 Brandi, as a phenomenologically informed art theorist, We therefore label Brandi's attitude toward conservation estranged, given that he considers architecture exclusively as pure presence or astanza in the act of conservation, rather than as a site of human dwelling. We describe it as estranged because, despite arriving at a seemingly appropriate phenomenological deduction of the work of art, he does not consider the existential dimension of the architectural place that we find as one of its most salient features. Architecture has both a dimension as meaning and a dimension as presence. Estranged conservation coincides with Brandi's notion of restoration which takes the work of art as an intemporal and meaningless entity. Similarly to how phenomenology seems to accept the intemporal quality of the work of art, some contemporary scholars emphasize the preconceptual aspect of aesthetic experience; Brandi is a the precursor to this approach. 14 In this sense, it is our contention that meaning (including language, signification, predicative thought, actuality and so forth) and presence -astanza in Brandi's terms -are but different aspects of the manifold condition of the architectural place in which presence manifests its intemporal aesthetic dimension.
Meaningless Architectural Presence
For Heidegger, art in the modern West seems detached from its authentic origin and is thus treated as meaningless. Heidegger and Brandi articulate art's meaninglessness in different ways. Brandi, in his Teoria Generale della Critica, finds the original sense of meaning in reference, namely as a correlative to the linguistic sign. 15 He detaches language, however, from any ontological relationship with the notion of truth, because his understanding of sign comes from the Kantian theory of the schema. This detachment of art from meaning is not articulated -as Heidegger had done -as the interplay between the concealment and unconcealment of being. It is rather, presented as a false problem; "the horizon to which one cannot ever be close enough, because we ourselves are the horizon. The reality, as the possession of the real, is a progressive approach that leaves us always as far away as before." 16 Brandi describes the notion of art as detached from meaning as a manifestation of pure presence or astanza. By contrast, Heidegger links aesthetics back to its sensual origins:
we do not need first to call or arrange for this situation in which we let things encounter us without mediation. The situation always prevails. In what the senses of sight, hearing, and touch convey, in the sensations of color, sound, roughness, hardness, things move us bodily, in the literal meaning of the world. The thing is the aisthēton, that which is perceptible by sensations in the senses belonging to sensibility. Hence the concept later becomes a commonplace according to which a thing is nothing but the unity of a manifold of what is given in the senses. Whether this unity is conceived as sum or as totality or as Gestalt alters nothing in the standard character of this thing-concept. 17 Heidegger suggests that after the mistake of identifying the thing with the idea, truth also came to be understood as correspondence between, in Brandi's terms, sign and referent. 
Aesthetics, Truth and Language
Heidegger suggests that aesthetics as a reflection on art was not required in classical Greece because art was instead the way of knowledge itself; it was the way in which Dasein related to its world "integrated into a unified and meaningful totality." 25 It was only later, in Plato, that beauty came to be understood as the manifestation of truth, in the eidos of things. This Platonic conception of truth reduces art to the role of imitation of the idea, displacing it from the privileged place of alētheia that Heidegger finds essential. With Heidegger's notion of art as alētheia or unconcealment, art itself would be the origin of the work of art and the artist. 26 If art is unconcealment, then it isn't mimetic, making clear how architecture can be art. The detachment between architecture and mimesis was a difficult one for Brandi to account for. On the one hand, he says that art forms like painting (or sculpture), "given its figurative nature, exists in spatial autonomy that is the prerequisite of pure reality." On the other hand, it seemed obvious to him that architecture did not imitate anything. 27 What could an architectural mimesis imitate? Instead, the key to his approach to architecture as art can be found in his use of the Kantian schematism, which determines an epistemological position and not an existential one.
It has been suggested that Kant's demand for universal assent in matters of taste requires an appeal to a human community of sense (sensus communis) as a possible destiny "perhaps never to be realized." 28 For Heidegger, language, and especially poetic language, plays a primordial role in bringing forth the essence of beings, clearing the concealment of Being itself. 31 We do not wish to dwell on the linguistic essence of the bringing forth of truth, but in the non-linguistic manifestation of the unconcealedness of the Being of beings.
Heidegger writes
Art, as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry. Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but equally poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of the work; for a work is in actual effect as a work only when we remove ourselves from our commonplace routine and move into what is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own essential nature itself to take a stand in the truth of beings. The essence of art is poetry. 
His way was inspired by the epistemological and neutral Kantian schematism and not
by an ontological analysis. Brandi's conservation was a way of recognising the artistic process as process developed in time. In terms of temporality, however, Heidegger suggested that truth becomes historical through art constituting the origin of creators and preservers. 34 Modern conservation has been taken since its beginning mainly as an objectivising activity and not often as an existential dwelling performance founded on care. Brandi's theory of restoration is no exception, although it is an outstanding example of philosophical reflection. Theoretical reflective knowledge is not to be marginalised; however, the preference that Heidegger suggested would demand a change of attitudes not only concerning architecture as a work of art -as the privileged place of manifestation of the truth of being -but arguably as the first, last and only place where Dasein dwells.
Intemporal Architectural Presence
The key concepts elaborated by Brandi, in particular his emphasis on art's intemporal condition, can best be made sense of in the context of a philosophical investigation of presence. For instance, scholars have called attention to certain conditions of extreme temporality, which are paramount in aesthetic experiences. 35 The suddenness and the ephemeral character of these conditions relate directly to
Brandi's aesthetic theory in which art is characterised as intemporal. Gadamer, for example, suggests that "[a]n entity that exists only by always being something different is temporal in a more radical sense than everything that belongs to history. It has its being only in becoming and return". 36 Given the varied ways in which artistic qualities can be perceived, this argument seems controversial. Brandi bases his theory of restoration on a double instantiation of the work of art -the historical and the aesthetic -that allows consideration of its possible temporal insertion in history. 37 The historical is implied in the existence of the architectural object in time and eventually in its constant use; the aesthetic is given in the recognition of the work of art as such, appearing only in exceptional moments. The first instance, however, seems to be the one in which temporality is common-sensically manifested. given, not as something to work with. 39 Gadamer instead believes that preservation implies artistic activity because for him architecture has the mission to mediate spatially between drawing attention to itself and redirecting it to the world that architecture accompanies. 40 Architecture, for Gadamer, is not important as an attractive artistic object, but as the sanctuary of mankind's existence. Thus, the approach to the architectural work of art is different from that to other forms of art. 
CONSERVATION OF PLACE ACCOMPANYING DASEIN
We suggest the emergence of cultivation and care as the base of a common collective understanding in order to conserve not only culturally significant architecture but also architectural places in general. Architecture may constitute not only an artistic object or one that is simply present or merely useful; architecture participates in an inseparable way in Dasein's existence. A problem arises with the sudden transformation of the world that supported the emergence of certain styles or works of architecture. Sometimes Dasein is compelled to exist in a world that is not there anymore. 41 We have seen that architecture is not only given to us in sensual presentation, but also as constituent of an environment in which we corporeally are. This corporeal aspect of architecture points to Dasein's dwelling as a key component of architecture.
The in of being-in-the-world starts with the body. For Dasein, the body is the first and the only personal occupied space. After that first being there that the body characterises, Heidegger would suggest that the spatiality of Dasein "[...] is the point at which we need to return to the aroundness (das Umhafte) of the environment (Umwelt) of Dasein as being-in-the-world." 42 Heidegger's notions of concern and care relate to this region that we call cultivated and cared for. We now seek to elaborate an account of care pertinent to our times. In doing so, we must account for how conservation may shift from a fallen emphasis on objects of the past towards a futural sense of the existence of being-among-others.
In-the-World
According to this interpretation of Heidegger, considering the aroundness (das Umhafte) of its environment (Umwelt) and the in-ness of its being-in-the-world, both understood as dwelling, is necessary to understand the spatiality of Dasein. It has been suggested that the in-ness can be understood in two senses, one of inclusion and one of dwelling, one of being and one of understanding. 43 Brandi recognises the possibility of conservation beyond the purity of the work of art in the context of the historical instance of restoration. Heidegger, by constrast, privileges dwelling, taking care as a pre-theoretical attitude, a form of concern that never abandons Dasein.
The world is given to humanity not as a Cartesian system of spatial coordinates but as environments made out of the things objectively present that help Dasein to orient itself in the world by configuring a particular spatiality. Heidegger has suggested that the way in which Dasein sees the world is obtained from within the world, making spatiality pre-objective, existential-ontological and not physicalmathematical. 44 Brandi's view of conservation is directed to attaining a critical recognition and thus a cognitive apprehension of the work of art. For Brandi, architecture, as work of art, presents the challenge of being intertwined with an existential dimension that he sets aside, at least for the aims of conservation. He did not see architecture as the whole that constituted a human environment to be conserved integrally with its artistic nature. Rather, he took architecture's two aspects, the artistic and the historical, and treated them as in need of separate forms of conservation. What we are suggesting is that the inclusion of an existential, in this case Heideggerean, perspective could add an additional value for the particularities that architecture presents as the place of human dwelling.
Architecture as a work of art cannot be only considered as something presentat-hand (as a mere thing) or ready-to-hand (as equipment); however, it can be taken as both when its artistic nature is concealed. For instance in terms of architecture's utility for inhabitation it is revealed as something ready-to-hand. Nevertheless, as soon as we perceive architecture, we perceive the others of the world. 45 As a non-figurative art form, architecture brings inhabitation as its revealing happening to presence.
Inhabitation, however, is about Dasein and not about other objects. The house is primarily shelter, a place to live and to rest, and therefore it is an internal space, a room of air and light, but also of welcoming shade and siesta. One must shape it on the base of a person's life, and not only on certain functions, isolated and geometrically met. 46 These characteristics, however, are absent from the artistic conservation his notion of restoration implies, leaving Brandi's understanding of conservation of architecture as art as estranged from Dasein's being-in-the-world.
In his famous essay "Building Dwelling Thinking," Heidegger emphasised the roots of cultivation and care for the terms building and dwelling. He discloses relations of the words with notions of cherishing, protecting, preserving, and caring as well as with modes of building such as cultivating or edifying. 47 One can suggest, with
Heidegger, the conservation of architecture as the privileged place for Dasein to dwell and consider the clearing of the space for it to be free and safe. We suggest that this ideal is constituted by the architectural place, which includes culturally significant architecture as a substantial part, but in no case the only part, and not always the most important part for the inhabitation of humanity. Whether it is still needed to dwell, in
Heidegger terms, or another existential interpretation is an open question.
Being Temporalizing Beings
We have suggested cultivation and care as a field for Dasein's life that merges familiar perceptions, public opinion and individual participation. This field was filled in pre-modern times by the traditional world and its slow evolution. Modernity and post-modernity broke that balance leaving the field to be filled with what Heidegger called the fallenness of the world. Fallenness is characterised as one of the constituents of care in Heidegger's thought, the one that puts its emphasis in the present. Cultivation and care, as they used to happen in pre-modern times, to create and preserve the architectural place were interrupted; they are now a dominant concern.
At this point we must clarify our use of the terms cultivation and care.
Although they are motivated from an existential approach, we associate cultivation Cultivation, as related to Bildung, means looking after the environment from the most comprehensive horizon for the benefit of the others that exist with oneself.
Cultivation implies a letting ourselves grow in the opening towards the others. 
ARCHITECTURAL HABITUATION TO CONSTANT BECOMING
This article aims to move the philosophical discussion on conservation forward towards a broader understanding in terms of human existence rather than one based only on the preservation of architectural objects. From a theoretical perspective, it is hoped that this article will stimulate further developments with similar approaches to conservation, thus helping to overcome the impasse in which preservation seems to be trapped. On the practical side, taking the existential dimension seriously, especially in the context of culturally significant architecture, presents additional challenges that go beyond the merely technical problems of conservation, compelling stakeholders, institutions and conservators to negotiate and consider these issues in future proposals. Stone is a forehead where dreams moan, / devoid of curved water, frozen cypress. / Stone is a shoulder to carry time / with trees of tears and ribbons and planets. 57 This poem by García Lorca seems to suggest those absences with which architecture is sometimes even more present to us than in its material factuality; it does not make a difference whether it is to be born, to live, or to die, such as the unfortunate bullfighter to whom the poem is dedicated. Being there, if authentic Dasein, always will compel us to grow and to care about our place. 
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